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ABSTRACT  
 
The 2015 World Development Report, Mind Society and Behaviour (World Bank, 
2015), seeks a redesign of development policy on the basis of insights emerging from 
behavioural economics. This paper offers a critical assessment of the Report across 
four dimensions. First, it situates the Report within the broader and evolving 
knowledge role of the Bank. Second, the paper locates the Report in the context of the 
evolution of economics as a discipline and how this informs the evolution of the 
Bank‘s development economics. Third, the Report is critically assessed for its narrow 
take on behavioural economics itself. Finally, the practical significance of the 
promotion of behavioural economics is considered through reference to its use in 
interventions in health in general and in response to HIV/AIDS in particular. It is 
argued that the Report suggests a dramatic and flawed reduction of what development 
is about, in that it foregoes any analysis of the structural problems facing developing 
countries and fails to propose major reforms to tackle these. 
 
Keywords: behavioural economics, cash transfers, economics imperialism, nudge, 
World Bank, World Development Report. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1978, the World Bank published its first World Development Report (WDR) at the 
instigation of its then President, Robert McNamara. This launched a series that was 
rapidly to attain a large circulation worldwide. It reflected McNamara‘s attempt to 
transform the Bank into a development institution with an explicitly intellectual 
leadership role. Each year the Report focuses on a different topic. This allows the 
Bank to explore more systematically what it considers to be the core issues in 
development. The Reports do not seek to break new ground but serve as a vehicle 
through which Bank member governments can be mobilised around a particular 
understanding of development (Yusuf, 2009: 17).
1
 The WDRs provide us with ‗an 
extraordinary window‘ on the way the Bank understands the discipline and practices 
of development economics.
2
 They lend an opportunity to assess the way in which the 
Bank exercises its knowledge role and of the implications this has across the 
discipline.
3
 
 
The latest WDR 2015 (World Bank, 2015: 13), entitled Mind, Society and Behaviour, 
draws on behavioural economics and seeks to redesign development policy on the 
basis of ‗an expanded understanding of human behaviour‘. The Report focuses on 
how individual decisions can be managed for better outcomes, but overlooks the need 
for consideration of underlying structural features. This paper offers a critical 
assessment of the Report across four dimensions. The first section situates the Report 
within the broader and evolving knowledge role of the Bank. This bears on how the 
Bank understands its role in the production and dissemination of knowledge, even 
applying its latest insights into the behaviour of its own staff. The next section locates 
the Report in the context of the evolution of economics as a discipline and how this 
informs the evolution of the Bank‘s development economics. The latest Report‘s 
substance is shown to be a result of the promotion of a particular (economic) 
understanding of development into which behavioural economics, and the policy of 
‗nudge‘, easily fits.4 The Report is shown to constitute a leading example of the latest 
phase of economics imperialism applied to development. Instead of expanding the 
domain of application of economic theory through the application of utility 
maximising principles in a variety of domains, economics (imperialism) not least in 
                                                        
1
 Shahid Yusuf was himself the Director of the 1999/2000 WDR. 
2
 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0
,,contentMDK:20227703~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html 
3
 See Bayliss et al. (2011) for a collection of essays dissecting the Bank‘s research across a 
range of topics.  
4
 Nudge is the title of Thaler and Sunstein‘s (2008) bestselling book, having become the verb 
that synthesises the behavioural economics approach to policy-making.  
the latest WDR, now expands and consolidates its scope through appending the 
behavioural economics‘ view of human action.5 Subsequently, the Report is assessed 
for its take on behavioural economics itself. It is argued that this is narrow both from 
within the behavioural sciences and in the associated understanding of the social 
determinants of individual behaviour. Finally, the significance of the promotion of 
such behavioural economics is considered in practice through an examination of its 
use in health interventions, with a particular interest in those seeking to affect 
HIV/AIDS prevalence.  
 
The paper concludes that the incursion of behavioural economics into development 
policy is indicative of the World Bank‘s avoidance of tackling fundamental problems. 
It moves its actions further away from a tradition based on the identification of the 
structural problems that trap countries in impoverished development, proposing the 
alternative of minor tinkling with extant structures. This is not particularly surprising. 
It resonates with previous paradigmatic shifts in development policy and is equally in 
tandem with developments within economics itself. What is new is that the obstacles 
to development and poverty alleviation are now deemed to reside in deficient 
decision-making and that the remedies to tackle poverty consist of ‗nudges‘, i.e. 
minor changes to context that make it easier for the poor to choose better options.
6
  
 
WDR 2015 AND THE KNOWLEDGE BANK 
 
The WDR constitutes the most important flagship report produced by the economics 
research department of the Bank (Development Economics Group, DEC). It offers a 
useful lens for a critical appraisal of the Bank‘s knowledge role, providing insights 
into the way in which the Bank‘s production and dissemination of development 
expertise underpins its intellectual and political influence. A few years ago, on the 
occasion of the thirtieth volume within the series, the 2015 Nobel prize winner, Angus 
Deaton, offered a strongly negative appraisal of the Reports and what they reveal 
                                                        
5
 See Mäki (2009) and Fine and Milonakis (2009) on the concept of economics imperialism. 
6
 In this respect, the Report compares unfavourably with its predecessors that at least focused 
on the major issues of agriculture, gender, jobs, the environment, etc. see 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/0
,,contentMDK:20227703~pagePK:478093~piPK:477627~theSitePK:477624,00.html 
regarding the Bank‘s intellectual role.7 In a short piece entitled: World Development 
Report at 30: A Birthday Tribute or Funeral Elegy, Deaton (2009: 113) wonders 
whether the WDR has turned from a star ‗to a red dwarf or even a black hole‘? He 
continues: ‗the development expertise that is at the centre of the World Bank‘s 
mission may not exist in useful form, or at the least, needs to be fundamentally 
rethought and restricted‘. This raises a set of issues regarding the WDR and the Bank 
as a putative, self-designated ‗Knowledge Bank‘.  
 
Before exploring these in more detail, however, attention should be drawn to the way 
in which the WDR is funded. While originally the WDRs were funded through the 
Bank‘s own research budget, they are now co-financed through Trust Funds.8 Trust 
Funds are provided to the Bank by specific donors which, in return, can exert a 
significant degree of control over the deployment of these funds.
9
 The WDR 2015 
itself was funded through substantial donor contributions, including by the UK‘s 
official aid agency DfID, the Department for International Development (World Bank 
Group, 2014: 30). Against that backdrop, the Report then emerges not solely as a 
reflection of what the Bank sees as pertinent to development, but also as an attempt 
on the part of the British and other governments to increase the influence of 
behavioural economics over policy.  
 
Indeed, on casual evidence, there seems to be something of an increasingly revolving, 
if not open, door between the worlds of scholarship, politics and self-interest. And 
behavioural economics is no exception. As mentioned, the UK‘s DfID has funded the 
WDR and it is no accident that the current UK Government has set up its own 
‗behavioural insight team‘, popularly known as the nudge unit. It is headed by David 
Halpern, and it has been partially privatised (a first for a government think tank), with 
its staff taking a third of the shares themselves and in order to be able to be paid more 
                                                        
7
 The Report offered strong criticism of the Bank‘s scholarly role but failed to put any serious 
dent into the Bank‘s stature within, or influence over, the discipline. See Bayliss et al. (2011) 
for a comprehensive review.  
8
 The costs of producing a WDR have increased dramatically, from US$ 3,613,000 (of which 
US$ 1,188,000 came through Trust Funds) for WDR 2002 to US$ 8,427,000 (of which US$ 
2,232,000 was provided through Trust Funds) for WDR 2010 (World Bank, 2011: 55) 
9
 Research programmes within the Bank that have been financed through Trust Funds 
including: the Poverty Dynamics and Public Service Delivery Trust Fund, the Global Public 
Goods Trust Fund, the Investment Climate and Trade and Integration Trust Fund (World 
Bank Group, 2014. 
flexibly. It is being housed in the charity Nesta, an innovation foundation, headed by 
Geoff Mulgan. The benefit to all concerned will accrue through government and other 
contracts, not least no doubt from the World Bank itself as it promotes nudge 
consultancy.
10
 
 
Returning to the specific issue of the WDR and the Bank‘s exercise of its scholarly 
role, several questions arise. First, what is the development expertise or intellectual 
stature lodged with the Bank‘s research department (DEC), which the WDR seeks to 
showcase? To illustrate the stature of the Bank‘s research enterprise, consider its 
scale. For nearly a decade, the resources of the Bank‘s economics research 
department have largely exceeded the resources available to any university 
department or research institute working on development.
11
 Since 1995, Bank 
researchers have published over 15,000 scholarly books and articles, and the Bank has 
led a vast expansion of development data (World Bank, 2012: 2). Between 2009 and 
2011 alone, Bank staff and consultants produced over 3000 publications, including 
over 200 books, 1300 scholarly articles in peer-reviewed journals and 1000 policy 
research working papers (p. 3). The Bank‘s working papers form the second most 
downloaded series via the search engine Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), 
behind the NBER Working Paper series (p. 4). In the words of Stern and Ferreira 
(1997: 524), the Bank cannot be seen as ‗just one of a number of fairly equal actors in 
the world of development economics‘. 
 
                                                        
10 Note that both Halpern and Mulgan seem to have moved seamlessly from being 
researchers in Tony Blair‘s Cabinets, with Mulgan heading overall research and Halpern, 
amongst other things, heading the unit for promoting social capital. Strikingly, social capital 
was itself heavily promoted by the Bank from the mid-1990s before being precipitously 
abandoned at the beginning of the millennium. Whilst the Bank‘s own take on social capital 
studiously ignored its role in promoting the elite, rich and powerful, it is possibly germane 
that the Institute for Government, for which Halpern served as Founding Director twixt 
serving Labour and Tory governments, has been primarily funded by the Gatsby Charitable 
Foundation, whose chief donor (of £1 billion or so) is former Labour Cabinet Minister, Lord 
Sainsbury. In this light, it is unsurprising that behavioural economics should be deployed as a 
vehicle for promoting particular postures irrespective of its suitability for such and the 
scholarly standards involved. 
11
 The budget of the Bank‘s research department has been hovering around US$50 million 
annually for the last few years (World Bank, 2012: 113). This can be compared, for instance, 
to the budget for research and grants of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), which 
stood at £25 million in 2014, http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-
opinion-files/9774.pdf.  
Second, how has the Bank traditionally understood its own intellectual role as 
practised through its WDR series? The Bank sees four objectives for its research 
programme: to generate knowledge that is a global public good and serves the 
development community; to guide the Bank‘s corporate strategies, policy advice, 
lending operations and technical assistance; to support specific Bank operations; and, 
finally, to assist in developing research capacity in Bank member countries (World 
Bank, 2012: 1). For the Bank, its knowledge role then resembles that of a ‗clearing 
house for knowledge about development‘, ‗disseminator of development knowledge 
and policy lessons‘, its knowledge provides an ‗international public good‘, and the 
Bank operates as an ‗honest knowledge broker‘ (Stone and Wright, 2007: 14; see also 
Wolfensohn, 1996). The Bank‘s research exercise is bestowed with neutral and 
professional qualities, with this image reinforced by the assumed technical and 
apolitical character of economics, the discipline dominating its research (Benjamin, 
2007; Swedberg, 1986). Clearly, the Bank‘s own account of its knowledge role is 
prone to misgivings. The Bank‘s knowledge exercise is not a neutral, politically-
impartial or technical enterprise, but needs to be understood within its political, 
economic and disciplinary contexts. There exists a large body of critical commentary 
on the Bank‘s knowledge role drawing explicit attention to a set of governance 
features (see Broad, 2006; Wade, 2002), as well as to the role of economics as the 
Bank‘s foremost scholarly discipline (Fine, 2001).  
 
Third, how is this taken forward in WDR 2015? In a chapter dealing with the ‗biases‘ 
of development professionals including its own (World Bank, 2015: Chapter 10), 
WDR 2015 puts forward proposals to make development organisations, like the Bank, 
more effective. This would entail that: ‗development practitioners become more 
aware of their own biases and that organisations implement procedures to mitigate 
their effects‘ (p. 5). This sounds promising, but how is it understood? Development 
professionals are seen as influenced by their own mental models, which may be 
inappropriate for understanding the context within which project beneficiaries 
operate. The reasons for this inadequacy are manifold, but, the Report highlights the 
‗disciplinary, cultural and ideological priors‘ that govern the engagement of 
development professionals with development problems. Yet, these ‗priors‘ are 
entirely understood in terms of personal attributes of the individual, rather than being 
attached to the culture of a discipline, collectively created and enforced through a host 
of processes, including university education, publication strategies, awarding of 
research funding, etc., or that they are related to the institutional context and the 
particular policy imperatives this may imply.  
 
Sense-making in the WDR is reduced to an individualised, isolated process, even if 
the individuals are projected to ‗think socially‘ as well as being potentially caught in 
particular ‗mental frames‘. The latter are not located in the realm of disciplinary and 
intellectual contexts (World Bank economics) but derive entirely from the 
professional‘s characteristics as an individual (like any other), rather than as an 
economist or social scientist, reproducing a particular disciplinary order governed by 
particular canons, or as affected by particular institutional dynamics related to the 
Bank‘s shareholder realities, the origins of its funds and the particular policy agendas, 
and biases, that these imply. So if ‗social‘ or ‗mental models‘ are brought into the 
analysis, this ‗recognition‘ remains devoid of any reflection upon the specificities 
attached to the individual reproducing him/herself within a specific disciplinary 
culture and institution. There are no implications attached to the practice of 
economics; nor the resonance of particular trends within economics, or to the location 
of the professional within the World Bank. Essentially, the Bank‘s professionals make 
mistakes because they are not the poor people for whom they prescribe policies (and 
hence do not share their mental models), rather than that Bank development 
professionals make mistakes because of the use of particular, generally inappropriate, 
analytical categories, the selective use of evidence, the promotion of findings in 
support of particular policy imperatives, etc. This is all a far cry from Broad‘s (2006) 
account of the soft laws governing Bank scholarly activities or from Deaton et al. 
(2006), each of which highlights that Bank research tends to favour particular policy 
practices.
12
 
 
SITUATING THE TURN TO BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS AT THE BANK 
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 But see Van Waeyenberge and Fine (2011: 35-6) on how the underlying reasons for these 
biases remain ill-explored in the Deaton Report.  
The evolution of the World Bank‘s economics can be tracked through a number of 
overlapping and sequenced trajectories.
13
 Most obvious has been that of mainstream 
economics, which evolved along a number of opposing divides. Foremost, at least 
initially in the post-war period, was that between (Keynesian) macroeconomics and a 
subordinate but prominent microeconomics. This left separate space for a variety of 
applied and empirical fields (such as development economics). Other social sciences 
remained more or less untouched by economics as a consequence of a relatively rigid 
interdisciplinary division of labour.
14
  
 
These conditions around scholarship dovetailed with the separate trajectories of 
context and corresponding policy imperatives. For the restricted scope of 
macroeconomics and microeconomics allowed the old or classic development 
economics, and a corresponding development studies, to prosper, drawing upon 
economic and social history and from other social sciences and inductive methods. 
Within the Bank, this took the form of looking for empirical regularities in the 
development process and for models of, and policies for, modernisation that served 
Cold War purposes, ultimately leading intellectually to the longstanding role as Chief 
Economist at the Bank of Hollis Chenery, serving from 1972 to 1982.
15
  
 
The end of the post-war boom in the 1970s signalled not only the monetarist counter-
revolution spearheaded by Milton Friedman but even more virulent forms of laissez-
faire macroeconomics and microeconomics, with increasing subordination of 
macroeconomics to microeconomics. The University of Chicago took the lead in 
consolidating the influence of various strands of neoliberal thinking. Further, the 
independent fields of applied and empirical economics (such as public, regional, 
industrial and development economics) were increasingly incorporated into 
microeconomics. Moreover, under the banner of perfectly working markets, and 
perfectly rational individuals, the nature and role of the state was reduced to total 
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 See Milonakis and Fine (2009), Fine and Milonakis (2009), Bayliss et al. (2011) and Fine 
(2002 and 2014). 
14
 ‗Economics imperialism‘, however, had deep roots in the 1950s with the emergence in 
particular of cliometrics, public choice theory and human capital theory. This ‗old‘ form of 
economics imperialism was pioneered by Gary Becker and reduced the non-market to a more 
or less perfectly working market (Fine and Milonakis, 2009). 
15
 When he and others of his ilk were cleared out by Anne Krueger in paving the scholarly 
conduit for the Washington Consensus. 
ineffectiveness other than to allow for inefficient distortion. With a short lag, the new 
development economics emerged in the early 1980s, denying that development 
required separate principles, focusing on the microeconomics of corruption and rent-
seeking and otherwise leading towards markets working perfectly if not subject to 
state intervention (see Krueger, 1986).  
 
At the Bank, the Washington Consensus shaped scholarship, ideology and policy in 
practice, with loose and, at times, inconsistent relations of these to one another. For 
scholarship, in particular, the Bank began to define the field of development 
economics almost to the point of appropriating it; not least in setting the agenda of 
state versus market. Further, for policy, from earlier pre-occupations with providing 
funding for ‗hard‘ infrastructure, through ‗softer‘ concerns for poverty alleviation, the 
Bank began its journey to what has now become a self-appointed responsibility for all 
aspects of economic and social policy (social security, pensions, labour markets, 
health, education, etc.), while having recourse to an ever narrower set of intellectual 
and policy tools to address them. And, with ideology, neoliberal mantras coincide 
with substantial, wide-ranging and continuing interventions to promote the ―market‖. 
 
Such expansion in scope of World Bank activity across scholarship, ideology and 
policy in practice was accelerated rather than diminished by the launch of the post-
Washington Consensus in the late 1990s, and what might be termed the newer 
development economics. It unavoidably aligned with the new phase of economics 
imperialism associated with imperfectly working markets due to asymmetric 
information, in which economic and social structures, institutions, customs, habits, 
culture, are explained as the rational, and possibly collective, response to imperfectly 
working markets.
16
 Significantly, this retained both the optimising individual and the 
predominance of microeconomic principles as the basis for macroeconomics and 
macro phenomena more generally. 
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 Krugman‘s alternative draws upon increasing returns to scale as opposed to asymmetric 
information. It has been much less prominent in scale and scope but has inspired new 
international trade theory and the new economic geography, with a WDR (2009) dedicated to 
the latter, Fine (2010a) for a critique.  
By treating non-market institutions as responses to market imperfections, this new 
phase of economics imperialism extended the reach of economics over both the other 
social sciences and of development economics itself. Microeconomic principles had 
become so well-established that it became second nature to combine them with other 
disciplinary resources from across the social sciences. Ironically, it included also 
variables or approaches that had been explicitly excluded from the purview of 
economics when these core principles were established in the first place.
17
 In addition, 
this process of ‗suspension‘18 – taking core principles as uncritical point of departure, 
they are both there and not there at the same time – has been accompanied by a 
parallel process of simply adopting the methodology and formal techniques of 
economics. Statistical investigation has become especially prodigious within 
economics, with at most the loosest of attachments to theory. The result is the 
emergence of The Economics of Almost Everything (Frank, 2007).
19
 Within the field 
of development what might be termed the newest development economics has 
emerged, the most prominent illustration being randomised control trials, which 
reduce policy-making to a mere technical problem with the aid of expert knowledge 
and opinion (Prince, 2012), quite apart from in part shifting the study of development 
from the field to the laboratory whilst consolidating the shift in focus of analysis from 
major transformation to individual psychology and behaviour. 
 
This sets the scene for the WDR‘s focus on behavioural economics, an approach 
strengthened by the global crisis – if (financial) markets did not work perfectly, 
individuals must be, in some sense, at fault and/or misread. The application of 
behaviour economics recipes to the developing world, however, is not new. Two 
renowned advocates of the behavioural approach to development, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2011: 269), had already advanced arguments for this shift. First, they note that the 
poor and their counterparts in the developed world are equally prone to cognitive 
limitations and self-control problems, and thus similar policy prescriptions apply. 
Second, behaviour economics lessons are argued to be even more relevant in the 
developing world as individuals in these societies can rely neither on properly 
functioning markets nor on a protective welfare state. The behavioural approach to 
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 Fixed preferences and motivation are examples. 
18
 See Fine (2011). 
19
 Or ‗Freakonomics‘ (Levitt and Dubner, 2005). 
development is seen as even more pertinent as ‗the poor bear responsibility for too 
many aspects of their lives, being far more vulnerable to cognitive and self-control 
biases‘. Finally, behaviourally-inspired approaches that involve minor tinkering with 
the context of choice have the additional advantage of being perceived as cost-
effective. And this is clearly a feature of the behavioural approach to development 
welcomed by WDR 2015: ‗The behavioral perspective on decision making suggests 
that seemingly minor and low-cost policy changes may have a large impact on the 
achievement of development goals and the reduction of poverty‘ (p. 38). 
 
The behavioural approach to development thus represents yet another paradigmatic 
shift further away from the older tradition focused on the structures that trap poor 
countries and poor people. It instead adopts a micro-level approach devoted to the 
management of choice within a given set of socioeconomic constraints, reinforcing 
the structures that might have generated the problems in the first place. In the 
developing world, with underdeveloped markets and weak or non-existent welfare 
systems, the possibilities for the behavioural approach appear overwhelming. Indeed, 
the more meagre are prospects for the advancement of market forces and the narrower 
the scope for government intervention, the more attractive becomes an individualistic 
approach to development based on improving individual choices.  
 
THE WDR APPROACH TO BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS 
 
The WDR’s mental model 
 
The latest WDR, while showcasing behavioural economics and promoting 
behaviourally-inspired development policy, still adopts neoclassical economics as its 
preferred mental model. Indeed, the neoclassical model is pervasive throughout the 
WDR. Consider the Report‘s stated goal, ‗to inspire and guide researchers and 
practitioners who can help advance a new set of development approaches based on a 
fuller consideration of psychological and social influences‘ (p. 2) and, most 
significantly, the text proceeds with the immediate disclaimer that ‗the new tools 
based on this full consideration of human factors do not displace existing policy 
approaches based on affecting self-interested personal incentives; rather, they 
complement and enhance them‘ (p. 3). 
 This literally echoes the way behavioural economics‘ positions itself towards 
neoclassical economics. For, Camerer and Loewenstein (2004: 3), two leading 
practitioners in the field, highlight how: ‗at the core of behavioural economics is the 
conviction that increasing the realism of the psychological underpinnings of economic 
analysis will improve the field of economics on its own terms – generating theoretical 
insights, making better predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting better policy‘. 
They also emphasise that the consideration of psychological factors is complementary 
to neoclassical economics since the relevance of human psychology to economics 
does not imply ‗a wholesale rejection of the neoclassical approach to economics 
based on utility maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency‘.  
 
The WDR‘s reliance on behavioural economics as neoclassical plus is, though, 
evident in its policy approach as its focuses on ‗how humans think (the processes of 
mind) and how history and context shape thinking (the influence of society) [and how 
this] can improve the design and implementation of development policies and 
interventions that target human choice and action (behaviour)‘ (p. 2). The emphasis 
on the processes of the mind draws on the seminal work of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974, 1981) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) on heuristics and biases, later 
reframed as the automatic system of judgment and choice as opposed to the 
deliberative system (Kahneman, 2003). The interest in the influence of society is 
inspired by the game-theoretical strand of behavioural economics, which incorporates 
in the individual utility function the agent‘s concern for the welfare of others (i.e. 
his/her social preferences in addition to the agent‘s concern for his/her own welfare) 
in the study of strategic and cooperative problems of social interaction (e.g. Camerer, 
2003). Yet, attention to automatic systems of judgment and choice implies a revision 
of the rationality assumption of neoclassical economics and, together with the game-
theoretical strand, undermines the assumption of self-interested and exogenous 
preferences. While both research strands then apparently challenge the neoclassical 
economics model of human action, these challenges are limited if not deceptive. For 
once context and interdependence come into play, these ought to be addressed as 
socially determined not individual attributes. 
 
To the contrary, the appeal of behavioural economics arises both from its continuity 
with, and its departures from, neoclassical economics (Fine, 2002; Davis, 2008). If, 
on the one hand, behavioural economics incorporates more realistic psychology in 
economic theorising, making it more palatable to policy-makers, on the other hand, it 
generally conforms to economics‘ preferred methods (i.e. individualism and 
formalism) and pro-market stance (Davis, 2008; Santos, 2011; Santos and Rodrigues, 
2014). And like other attempts at incorporating insights from other social sciences 
(Fine and Milonakis, 2009), the insights from psychology that are deployed in the 
behavioural economics approach are filtered through their compatibility with 
neoclassical economics‘ technical apparatus, resulting in a lack of genuine 
engagement with other behavioural sciences (see also Sent, 2004; Berg and 
Gigerenzer, 2010; Bazerman and Malhotra, 2012; Davis, 2013).
20
 
 
Automatic thinking, central to the WDR‘s take on behavioural economics, appears to 
simplify decisions, using associations and belief systems that compensate for missing 
information and facilitate decision-making. Automatic thinking is thus fast, effortless 
and associative, but sometimes leads to large and systematic mistakes. These stem 
from either errors in information processing (bounded rationality) or a mismatch 
between intentions and actions (bounded will power), i.e. failure in carrying out 
previously deliberated courses of action. Automatic thinking contrasts with 
deliberative thinking, which neoclassical economics characterises as decisions made 
on the basis of unbiased, effortful and reflective calculations of all possible outcomes 
from alternative choices. The dual system of thinking is taken to expand the standard 
economic model, allowing for the consideration of outcomes that deviate from those 
that would result from the deliberative system.  
 
On this account, that individuals rely on automatic thinking has significant 
implications for understanding development and for designing policies to tackle 
poverty, which seek to make it simpler and easier for individuals to choose courses of 
actions consistent with their desired outcomes and best interests. This requires paying 
close attention to the ‗choice architectures‘ underlying all institutionally mediated 
interactions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), assisting individuals in their decision-
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 This is crucial in rejecting the hypothesis of reverse imperialism between economics and 
the other social sciences. 
making by framing choices, ‗adjusting what information is provided, and the format 
in which it is provided‘ (p. 6). But such proposals, inspired by the heuristics and 
biases branch of behavioural economics research, still work with(in) the neoclassical 
framework approach, focusing on the problems posed by deviations to its rationality 
assumption, targeting solutions that make people behave more rationally. In this 
sense, behaviour in practice is akin to a (market) imperfection to be corrected as far as 
possible towards perfect rationality. 
 
The strand of behavioural research that has been inspired by game theory draws 
attention to so-called social preferences, i.e. people‘s aversion to inequality, abiding 
to social norms, and reciprocal or altruistic behaviours (e.g. Camerer and Fehr, 2004). 
Again, consideration of these aspects of human sociality is contrasted with the 
autonomous, self-regarding assumption of neoclassical economic theory. The policy 
implication is that a sole focus on external material incentives like prices is 
insufficient, and policy makers need to resort to ‗social incentives‘, mobilising social 
expectations, social recognition, patterns of cooperation, care of in-group members, 
and social norms for new kinds of intervention. 
 
This provides another indication of the intricate complementarity between 
neoclassical and behavioural economics. The former is taken to apply to situations 
where market exchanges are considered adequate and efficient, and where individual 
actions stem from people‘s deliberative systems. The latter applies to situations where 
forms of exchange based on trust and reciprocity are required and effective, and 
where individual actions have other-regarding considerations. However, the 
functional articulation between market and non-market spheres, which neoclassical 
and behavioural economics promote, takes the ‗liberal societies‘ of the developed 
world as their implicit contextual framing. The two spheres are considered 
complementary by both neoclassical and behavioural economists (see Santos and 
Rodrigues, 2014). The ultimate goal for policy then is to cultivate, through an 
appropriate institutional mix, the right combination of self-interest and other-
regarding considerations. In response, individuals would learn to be, simultaneously, 
‗habitual social exchangers‘ and ‗vigorous traders‘, meaning that markets could 
coexist with the social foundations on which they ultimately rely.  
 
Behavioural economics and development: the conquest of another frontier? 
 
The behavioural approach then offers an exemplary illustration of the application of 
the newer phase of economics imperialism to development, highlighted by the 
optimising individual plus something else approach. Most significantly, ‗(t)he new 
approaches do not replace standard economics‘ (p. 4). Instead, it is supplemented by a 
range of ways of behaving, ‗automatically‘ instead of ‗deliberatively‘, as well as 
determinants of behaviour, ‗thinking socially‘, depending on what others think, and 
‗thinking with mental models‘ (p. 3). Such is the privileging of the economic, which 
remains inconsistent with the non-economic, an insight unwittingly highlighted by the 
Report which acknowledges that ‗―Economic man‖ is a fiction, not a reality‘ (p. 25).  
 
But why a fiction should prevail at all is left unresolved, if unavoidable. For 
‗[p]olicies that assume that rational decision making will always prevail can go astray 
in many contexts … Updating the standard assumptions about human decision 
making is essential‘. The WDR sees this as a new insight, for ‗[t]hirty years ago, 
people might reasonably have viewed the findings of behavioral economics as a few 
anomalies‘ (p. 28/9). Yet it seems to have long prevailed, given that, ‗[t]he idea that 
people have two systems of thinking is not new and has been anticipated in the work 
of many psychologists and philosophers over the centuries‘ (p. 27). By the same 
token: ‗[e]veryone knows that economic incentives can influence behavior. What is 
less commonly recognized is that social incentives can also exert a powerful effect on 
behavior‘ (p. 43). In short, the WDR is caught between claiming the commonsense of 
not relying upon rationality, whilst both privileging the latter and ignoring the failure 
to have gone beyond rationality until recently.  
 
Even so, the enrichment of rationality is extremely limited and conforms to reliance 
upon universal notions of human behaviour in forms that are characteristic of 
(economic) rationality itself. Continual reference is made to the economic and the 
non-economic, the automatic and the deliberative, the intuitive and the reflective, the 
social and the mental, the framing, the anchoring and the loss aversion, the effortless 
and the effortful, emotion and cognition, instrumental and intrinsic reciprocity, and so 
on. Significant, here, from the smallest act of altruism to grand narratives of historical 
change, are the mental models that individuals adopt, for ‗[h]istorians attribute the 
rise of the modern world to a change in the mental model of how the universe works‘ 
(p. 72). 
 
Despite reference to the social nature or determinants of behaviour, these are totally 
decontextualized, implicitly reflecting asocial, ahistorical and universal notions of 
human, as individual, behaviour. Consequently, even as universals, there is no 
reference to power, conflict, class, gender, race, etc., in and of themselves let alone as 
the raw materials for understanding the systemic origins of (non-rational) behaviour.
21
 
Indeed, we are informed that, ‗both poor people and people who are not poor are 
affected in the same fundamental way by certain cognitive, psychological, and social 
constraints on decision making‘ (p. 81).22 At most, appeal is made to the eponymous 
institutions, cultures and customs that underpin irrational behaviour. And, of course, 
the acknowledgement of such influences opens the space to use them for policy 
purposes and ‗gives policy makers new tools for promoting development and provides 
new understandings for why policies based on standard economic assumptions can 
fail‘ (p. 72). The inevitable major conundrum for the WDR is, though, whether it is 
necessary to strengthen irrational behaviour in an imperfect world or reduce it to 
make it perfect. Thus, ‗[p]redicting exactly when these social relationships can help or 
hinder progress is still an open question and thus requires careful testing of program 
design‘ (p. 90).23 
 
Such decontextualisation of behaviour has two striking effects in the WDR. One is to 
range freely over examples of behaviours without regard to context since all 
behaviour conforms to universally prescribed notions of human nature. The result is 
an extraordinary enfeeblement of the WDR, for there is an unusually wide appeal to 
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 Equally striking is the total absence of any reference to the global crisis and the role of 
finance and financiers within it. 
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 And, as mentioned above, such behaviours are equally seen as characteristic of Bank 
operatives themselves, see above, for: ‗Because policy makers are themselves subject to 
cognitive biases, they should search for and rely on sound evidence that their interventions 
have their intended effects, and allow the public to review and scrutinize their policies and 
interventions, especially those that aim to shape individual choice‘ (p. 20). 
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 Indeed, concluding the section of parenting and childhood: ‗More experimentation and 
testing are needed to tailor interventions to the situations that parents experience, harnessing 
insights from neurobiology and the behavioral sciences to understand and tackle the 
psychological and cultural barriers to effective parenting that arise from the contexts in which 
individuals live‘ (p. 108). For a critique of the newly emerged field of neuroeconomics, itself 
exemplary illustration of the latest phase of economics, see Fine (2011, Appendix 1). 
illustrations that lack relevance for issues of development or are not drawn from 
development at all. For example, the WDR commends the use of stickers placed in 
Kenya minibuses which reduced the accident rate (p. 52-53), lockable metal boxes 
that increased investment in health products in a Kenya project (p. 120), a water-
saving campaign in a city in Colombia that featured the mayor and his wife taking a 
shower together (p. 176), posters of watchful eyes that aided in the payment for milk 
at an open tea and coffee station in a university in England (p. 47), and a project that 
used stickers and moved bins and benches to reduce secondhand smoke in 
Copenhagen Airport (p. 194).  
 
The other decontextualisation follows from the reduced way in which the social and 
systemic have been constructed out of the continuing commitment to a 
methodological individualism widened beyond economic rationality.
24
 This is most 
notable in the treatment of poverty where the role of behavioural economics is 
implicitly deployed as a means by which to encourage the poor to learn how to live 
with the condition, possibly even to escape from it, without once discussing the 
structural causes of poverty that both make it inescapable and condition the responses 
to it. Indeed, in a parody of economic rationality as optimisation subject to price and 
income constraints, the poor are both more, if identically with others, behaviourally 
motivated and, correspondingly, more behaviourally constrained (p. 81): 
 
First, poverty generates an intense focus on the present to the detriment of the 
future. When poor people must direct their mental resources toward dealing 
with the concerns of poverty—for example, paying off debts or keeping their 
children safe—they have less attention to devote to other important tasks that 
may be cognitively demanding, such as expending greater and more 
productive effort at work or making timely investments in education and 
health … Second, poverty can also create poor frames through which people 
see opportunities. Poverty can blunt the capacity to aspire … and to take 
advantage of the opportunities that do present themselves. 
                                                        
24
 Similar considerations apply to the neglect of the systemic sources of climate change, with 
an implicit presumption that this is driven by inappropriate individual (consumer) behaviour 
that as such can be remedied behaviourally. 
Third, the environments of people living in poverty make additional cognitive 
demands. The absence of certain physical and social infrastructure that eases 
cognitive burdens in high-income contexts—like piped water, organized child 
care, and direct deposit and debit of earnings—encumbers those living in low-
income settings with a number of day-to-day decisions that deplete mental 
resources even further. 
 
In short, the poor are offered a pathology of material and behavioural deprivation, 
which ‗in effect tax an individual‘s bandwidth, or mental resources. This cognitive 
tax, in turn, can lead to economic decisions that perpetuate poverty‘ (p. 81). 
 
The most obvious and immediate remedy might be to go to the source of the problem 
– the material deprivation that intensifies individual and social dysfunction. Far from 
it, for the goal is to rationalise intervention to improve the choices made by the poor 
within their behaviour-determining poverty (although, as will be seen, not always 
with their own benefit in mind). This is the neoliberal nudge dilemma – how to amend 
people‘s free will by amending their behaviour in their own best interests. In this case, 
the WDR suggests, ‗[f]irst, shaping choices can help people obtain their own goals‘, 
and ‗[s]econd, individuals‘ preferences and immediate aims do not always advance 
their own interests‘ (p. 20). Indeed: 
 
Still, it is not the case that when governments refrain from action, individuals 
freely and consistently make choices in their own best interest, uninfluenced 
by anyone else. Any number of interested parties exploit people‘s tendency to 
think automatically, succumb to social pressure, and rely on mental models … 
including moneylenders, advertisers, and elites of all types. In that context, 
governmental inaction does not necessarily leave space for individual 
freedom; rather, government inaction may amount to an indifference to the 
loss of freedom. 
 
Whether governments should intervene to help people make decisions that are in their 
own interests is a recurrent theme when discussing the policy implications of 
behavioural economics; and one raised at the outset by Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 
2008), placing their ‗nudge‘ proposal within a libertarian paternalistic approach to 
policy-making. While they reject the assumption that people always make choices in 
their best interest, granting the policy-maker the responsibility for organising the 
context in which people make decisions (the paternalistic stance), they are keen to 
stress that the policy-maker must refrain from constraining the options of the 
individual (the libertarian stance). The difficulty of reconciling these two aims is not 
surprisingly a subject of discussion.
25
 Relevant here is that the WDR also engages in 
this discussion, and on these terms,
26
 even if it adopts a forceful stance on the need for 
government action: ‗The standard justifications for government action in market 
economies are monopolies, externalities, public goods, asymmetric information, 
redistribution, and macroeconomic stabilization. This Report adds another. 
Governments should act when inadequate engagement, situational framing, and 
social practices undermine agency and create or perpetuate poverty.‘ (p. 203 
emphasis added). Again, the discussion on the role of government reveals the WDR‘s 
mental model taking neoclassical economics as the main theoretical and political 
reference. The market is retained as the default institution and non-market institutions 
are justified as rational solutions to market failures.  
 
How limited this is revealed in the illustrations deployed, where poor outcomes are 
consistently blamed on the poor choices people make. Indeed, lack of self-control is 
seen as the fundamental cause of poor outcomes throughout the Report. We turn 
people away from choice of sugary foods (p. 36) but say nothing about the production 
and agriculture supports to sugar in a world in which the obese now outnumber the 
hungry. For exploitative credit markets, there is a presumption of poor decision-
making from lack of financial literacy (p. 122) as opposed to desperate attempts to 
deal with starvation and medical expenses. However, despite the space given to 
experiments that improved people‘s financial information about payday loans, there is 
little reflection on the findings. In one experiment, individuals provided with better 
information about the true costs of payday loans (p. 32) were 11% less likely to use a 
payday loan service in the subsequent four month period. However, this ignores how 
limited is the change, only 11%, and that many were just as likely to use payday loans 
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 See also Sunstein (2014), as well as Goodwin (2012), Grüne-Yanoff (2012), Hausman and 
Welch (2010), and Sugden (2009) for a critique. 
26
 The WDR closes with a section entitled, ‗Why should governments shape individual 
choices?‘ (p. 202). 
even though they knew how punitive were the costs. Similarly, the Report asserts 
‗[l]ack of self-control is a leading explanation for lack of savings‘ (p. 120) and argues 
for commitment-based savings plans, without looking at poverty and need. Most 
blatant and revealing is the section concerned with the workplace, where it is assumed 
that people simply need to work harder (p. 132-3) (although no justification is given 
for why this is to their benefit and otherwise dysfunctionally irrational). Indeed, ‗there 
are many nonremunerative aspects of work that influence the effort that employees 
exert on the job‘ (p. 139). Maybe, low pay and poor working conditions might be 
more pertinent than ‗intention-action divides and what their peers are doing‘. 
  
However, behavioural findings may support policy proposals that extend beyond the 
nudge approach (Dolan et al., 2010; Oliver, 2013). For example, that human cognitive 
and emotional processes can be manipulated, to serve the undesirable and inefficient 
interests of firms, moneylenders, banks and other interested parties, may warrant 
regulations that impose limits on their actions. Behavioural findings may, therefore, 
suggest a wider range of policies, such as regulatory measures and laws that aim to 
change or create new institutional conditions deemed conducive to human welfare. 
But moving beyond minor tinkering with the context of choice in development policy 
would entail profound institutional change, not least bearing on an institution like the 
Bank. As the WDR reminds us, ‗achieving social change in a situation where mental 
models have been internalized may require influencing not only the cognitive decision 
making of particular individuals but also social practices and institutions‘ (p. 12).  
 
FROM BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS TO WORLD BANK POLICY IN 
PRACTICE: THE CASE OF HIV-RELATED CASH TRANSFERS 
 
The discussion so far may suggest that this WDR is mostly irrelevant. There is no 
substantive departure from the tenets of mainstream economics and the Report 
produces examples of behaviourally-aware policies that manage to be both mundane 
and ephemeral. Moreover, who would reject a policy approach that makes it easier for 
individuals to make better decisions? However, as innocuous as the Report appears in 
terms of policy, in practice it furthers a new trend in the design of development 
interventions which threatens to remove any commitment to the necessity for 
structural change as part of the development process. This has strong ethical as well 
as sustainability implications for development interventions. To illustrate the 
fundamental failures of an approach to development based on behavioural economics 
both in its limited understanding of poverty and its policy focus on individual choices, 
rational or otherwise, instead of engaging with underlying structural issues, we take a 
closer look at an example of health-related behavioural economics interventions, 
namely HIV-related cash transfers.  
 
While behavioural economics policies in the WDR often appear as subtle ‗nudges‘ to 
the choice environment,
27
 behavioural economics interventions in poor countries span 
a wide stage and take particularly intrusive forms. They have generally involved cash 
incentives to take up health services or to affect behaviour in particular ways. Indeed, 
cash transfers are now used extensively, and rough estimates suggest between 0.75 
and 1 billion people in low- and middle-income countries currently receive non-
contributory cash benefits (Barrientos and Niño-Zarazúa, 2010).
28
 However, it is 
necessary to distinguish between generic forms of cash transfers and those inspired by 
behavioural economics. On the one hand, standard cash transfer interventions aim to 
raise income of a particular group (either targeted in terms of age or other 
characteristics) and, in their conditional form, they often require beneficiaries to use 
nutrition or health services. On the other, cash transfers inspired by behavioural 
economics do not aim to reduce poverty as such but to change specific incentives 
around health behaviour. Here, following behavioural economics, people are agents 
who ignore health messages because of the weight of social pressure or who are 
myopic and heavily discount the future benefits of health-seeking activity, while 
overly valuing their current pleasure. For example, myopic individuals will not 
choose to eat healthily because they focus on the immediate pleasure of unhealthy 
foods and remain oblivious to the future benefits of a balanced diet, or they may not 
complete a course of TB treatment, as they focus on the immediate costs of repeated 
hospital attendance (rather than on the ultimate result of such repeated visits).  
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 For example, health-related libertarian paternalism in the North might focus on the way that 
a change to the layout of school canteens can increase the uptake of fruit and vegetables 
(http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/02/130226172506.htm, accessed 10 November 
2014) 
28
 For critical assessments of conditional cash transfers (CCTs), see Fine (2014), Lavinas 
(2013) and Saad-Filho (2014). 
A critical assessment of health interventions inspired by behavioral economics can be 
made on the basis of a closer examination of HIV-related policies. Within their 
context, individuals are seen as failing to take up HIV prevention messages by 
focusing on the immediate pleasure of unsafe sex while discounting the cost of 
acquiring HIV, either due to myopia or social norms. Thus, cash transfers become a 
way to affect the balance between short- and long-run benefits so that individuals 
become more likely to choose safe sex or abstinence (de Walque et al., 2012b: 2). The 
presumptions are, first, that incentives can increase the implicit price of unsafe sex 
(through the immanent loss of the cash reward); and second, that even if small, 
regular payments may ‗―nudge‖ individuals to overcome inertia and extricate 
themselves from unduly risky sexual relationships‘ (de Walque et al., 2012b: 2). 
Third, de Walque et al. (2012a: 14) also suggest that cash incentives provide 
individuals with an excuse for deviating from social norms, allowing them to act in 
conformity with their true underlying preferences for less risky behaviour. In essence, 
in such an approach, HIV epidemics are the result of sub-optimal decisions by 
individuals who (mistakenly) believe they are making, or are persuaded by social 
norms to deviate from, optimal decisions and who can be nudged into changing their 
choices (through cash transfers). 
 
Let us examine the implications of these presumptions through a critical dissection of 
a set of existing programmes. Projects to change HIV risk behaviours have been 
implemented in Lesotho, Malawi and Tanzania, while others have begun in South 
Africa (Johnston, 2015). For the designers of the Lesotho intervention, people engage 
in risky sexual behaviour despite high prevalence of HIV as they weigh the short-term 
benefits more highly than the long-term costs (Björkman-Nyqvist et al., 2013). De 
Walque et al. (2012a: 6) assert that the young people involved in the Tanzania 
RESPECT project ‗appear to understand their HIV risks and know how to behave to 
prevent transmission – yet they don‘t choose to act on that knowledge.‘  
 
It should be noted that, in general, cash transfers to change health incentives typically 
operate with smaller cash outlays and more stringent forms of conditionality than 
standard cash transfer programmes. In standard cash transfer programmes, such as, 
for instance, the Kenyan Orphans and Vulnerable Children programmes, US$20 per 
month is given to ‗the main care giver‘ in each participating household (Handa et al., 
2014). In contrast, in the Malawi rural incentive programme that sought to decrease 
HIV incidence rates, participants were allocated an amount of up to $16 to be paid 
one year later if they maintained their HIV-free status (Kohler and Thornton, 2012). 
In the Tanzania RESPECT programme, participants were paid either around $10 or 
$20 per four-month testing round if they tested negative for four curable sexually 
transmitted infections (STIs) (de Walque et al., 2012b). Finally, the Lesotho 
programme offered no guarantee of cash reward. If individuals tested negative for two 
easily treated STIs, they were eligible to participate in a lottery, with prizes the 
equivalent of US$74 or US$147 per four month testing round. In each round, four 
lottery winners were drawn (two men and two women) (Björkman-Nyqvist et al., 
2013). 
 
Behavioural economics inspired projects also have more stringent conditionality 
embedded within them than general cash transfer programmes. Standard poverty-
focused interventions may have no conditionality or might be conditional on school 
attendance. However, behavioural economics interventions tailor conditionality to 
incentivise behaviour change through higher frequency of rewards and use of external 
monitoring. De Walque et al. (2012a: 14) and Medlin and de Walque (2008: 5), for 
instance, argue that if people have high rates of discount (and thereby are at greater 
risk of acquiring HIV), they value quick payoffs and so awarding a reward after a 
long delay will tend to be ineffective. The programmes also often include frequent 
testing for STIs. In practice, however, HIV itself is not always used as a test indicator 
as it may be too insensitive to behaviour change and too expensive to test (Medlin and 
de Walque, 2008: 12-13; de Walque et al., 2012a: 12-13).  
 
Do projects inspired by behavioural economics produce their intended effects? In the 
Tanzania RESPECT Study, with its two sizes of cash transfer, only the higher 
payment group had a statistically significant difference in the STI indicators 
compared to the control group at the end of twelve months (de Walque et al., 2012b). 
Nonetheless, the data on HIV showed no significant difference (de Walque et al., 
2012b: 8). This casts doubt on the link between the STI indicators and HIV risk. It 
was not clear whether the study encouraged a change in sexual behaviour or whether 
it was observing a change in the treatment sought for the curable indicator STIs. In 
the Lesotho project, two years after its initiation, HIV incidence was significantly 
lower among the study participants, especially for women and for those with the 
greatest potential lottery payout (Björkman-Nyqvist et al., 2013). However, in the 
Malawi Incentive Project, the authors were surprised to find that male recipients 
ended up with a greater HIV risk, possibly as extra cash made them a more attractive 
sexual partner (Kohler and Thornton, 2012). In contrast, female recipients were less 
likely to report having had sex, leading the authors to conclude, rather myopically, 
that conditional cash transfers can be protective for women (2012: 169).  
 
Furthermore, it will be crucial to assess the longer-term impact of these programmes 
after they have come to an end. This is an area of limited information at the time of 
writing. In the Tanzanian RESPECT study, however, the impact on STI acquisition by 
women had disappeared two years after the end of the project (Heise et al., 2013: 4). 
Rigsby et al. (2000) studied the impact of a four-week cash transfer project on anti-
retroviral drug adherence among a sample of US veterans. While the use of monetary 
reinforcement clearly helped treatment adherence during the project, adherence in the 
cash-transfer group had returned to near-baseline levels eight weeks after its end. 
 
Overall then, these programmes have had mixed immediate results and strong 
concerns remain regarding their long-run impacts (not least in absence of account of 
longer-term, structural determinants). Their design also raises ethical issues, 
specifically regarding whether inclusion and exclusion from health-focused 
interventions can be justified and whether the intrusion of interventions is outweighed 
by the benefits (Johnston, 2015). Through the design of projects that remove benefits 
to individuals (some of whom are children or young adults) when they become ill, 
challenging ethical precedents are set. Another ethical concern arises in the context of 
a programme that establishes lotteries with groups who are seen as having a poor 
ability to behave rationally let alone assess risk.  
 
Finally, underlying these interventions is a narrow conceptualisation of ill health as 
the result of poor choices by individuals. More specifically, behavioural economics 
does not recognise the role of systemic (rather than individual) factors in explaining 
poor health, which are diverse, specific to particular health conditions and often 
deeply political. When these are ignored, it is not surprising that cash transfer projects 
have complex and sometimes limited impacts. At the same time, they appear 
attractive to policy makers: the simplistic premise of these projects may offer short-
cuts in dealing with politically difficult questions of power, distribution and class. 
However, this is not to suggest that interventions inspired by behavioural economics 
are harmless. Embedded within them are particular norms and values. By blaming 
individuals for their poor health, they cement stigma around the acquisition of 
illnesses like HIV. Further, by extending the commodification of health and welfare, 
they reduce the role of the state in guaranteeing health outcomes.
29
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Using WDR 2015 as lens through which to appraise the Bank‘s shifting scholarly 
roles exposes a set of issues. First, while the Bank‘s arguments about its position as 
knowledge bank have previously been organised around the attributes of the 
discipline of economics, we now have forays into the behaviour of development 
professionals, including Bank staff. Second, across the Report, what seems like a 
contradiction between universal notions of human behaviour and an emphasis on local 
context apparently dissolves once it is accepted that the latter is to be understood 
entirely in the service of the former, i.e. an interest in context emerges only to the 
extent that it allows a better understanding of the choice architecture facing 
individuals, rather than drawing attention to systemic or structural issues bearing on 
why poverty is reproduced.  
 
Third, the inadequacies of the Bank‘s economics (in principle and practice) are 
safeguarded through reference to behaviour – itself understood in highly reductionist 
terms. It nudges us into doing the right thing, while simultaneously steering safely 
away from structural issues bearing on worsening social and economic outcomes 
across the world, except of course through the further deepening of labour market 
reforms, and the restructuring of public services to the profit of private enterprise. The 
more we nudge, the less we need to budge in the face of worsening inequalities and 
the continuing assault of finance on living standards and democratic accountability. 
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 Arguably, the structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s exacerbated the HIV crisis in 
sub-Saharan African by crippling health systems, while the informalisation of labour markets 
has served to reduce employment-related health provision (O‘Laughlin, 2013).  
 
Finally, WDR 2015 implies a dramatic reduction of what development is about (recall 
the Report‘s focus on stickers in cars, metal boxes in households, showers with 
partner on television, etc.). While far removed from the mainstay of Bank 
interventions, increasingly through large public private partnerships in infrastructure, 
such interventions have, nevertheless, proven popular in certain fields, including 
health, often with dubious impacts and moral implications.  
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